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Abstract-In many (predominantly) publicly financed health care systems market-oriented health care 
reforms are being implemented or have been proposed. The purpose of these reforms is to make resource 
allocation in health care more efficient, more innovative and more responsive to consumers preferences 
while maintaining equity. At the same time. the advances in technology result in a divergence of 
consumers’ preferences with respect o health care and urge society to (re)think about the meaning of the 
solidarity principle in health care. In this paper we indicate some international trends in health care 
reforms and explore some potential future options. From an international perspective we can observe a 
trend towards universal mandatory health insurance. contracts between third-party purchasers and the 
providers of care, competition among providers of care and a strengthening of primary care. These trends 
can be expected to continue. A more controversial issue is whether there should also be competition among 
the third-party purchasers and whether in the long run there will occur a convergence towards some 
“ideal” model. Although regulated competition in health care can be expected to yield more value for 
money, it might yield both more efficiency and higher total costs. It has been argued that equity can be 
maintained in a competitive health care system if we interpret equity as “equal access to cost-effective care 
within a reasonable period of time”. Because the effectiveness of care has to be considered in relation to 
the medical indication and the condition of the patient, the responsibility for cost-effective care rests 
primarily with the providers of care. Guidelines and protocols should be developed by the profession and 
sustained by financial incentives embedded in contracts. It has been argued that the third-party purchasers 
could start to concentrate on the contracts with the primary care physicians. Contracts with other 
providers could then be a natural complement to these contracts. Coordinated-care contracts between the 
third-party purchasers and the consumer of care could provide the consumer with monetary incentives 
to go to efficient providers. A consumer choice of insurance contract could give the consumer an 
opportunity to make important choices in health care. However, each society has to make its own choices 
about what care should be available to everybody independent of an individual’s purchasing power. 
Copyright (~7 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd 
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INTRODUCTION 
In many (predominantly) publicly financed health 
care systems market-oriented health care reforms are 
being implemented or have been proposed. The 
purpose of these reforms is to make resource 
allocation in health care more efficient, more 
innovative and more responsive to consumers’ 
preferences while maintaining equity. At the same 
time the advances in medical technology result in a 
divergence of consumers’ opinions about the 
desirability of certain types of care, such as abortion, 
in vifro fertilization, treatments with a low probability 
of success and a high probability of complications, 
iatrogenesis, alternative health care (e.g. home- 
opathic care, acupuncture) and euthanasia. Further- 
more, advances in medical technology urge society to 
(re)think about the meaning of the solidarity 
principle in health care, which usually implies that 
every citizen contributes according to “ability to pay” 
and receives care according to “ability to benefit”. 
But does the solidarity principle also imply that 
everyone has access to all health care with any 
positive marginal effectiveness independent of the 
costs? And if not, which presumably is the case 
because society cannot afford it, what health services 
should be available to everybody independent of 
one’s purchasing power? The challenge, therefore, is 
not only to find new structures of organizing and 
financing health care, but also to find, within these 
new structures. a new balance between equity and 
efficiency. The purpose of this paper is to indicate 
some international trends in health care reforms that 
can be observed and, extrapolating these trends, to 
explore potential future options. 
TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE REFORMS 
At first sight the health care reforms in many 
countries seem very different from each other: all 
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reforms contain elements related to the country, 
specific aspects of a health care system; in many 
countries (e.g. Belgium, Germany and Sweden) the 
"reforms" consist of a series of incremental steps 
without a clear "blueprint"; and there is a lot of 
misleading ideological rhetoric. However, when 
looking at the concrete changes in the structure, 
organization and financing of health care systems 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, the following trends 
can be observed [1--6]. 
Mandatory health insurance 
A trend to universal, or near universal, mandatory 
health insurance arrangements can be observed. In 
the 1980s universal health insurance was im- 
plemented in Australia, Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain; and in the 1990s in Ireland, Israel and 
Switzerland. Extension of the mandatory health 
insurance system is under discussion in the Nether- 
lands, Turkey and the United States. Mandatory 
health insurance can be financed in different ways: by 
general taxes, earmarked taxes, national or local 
taxes, social insurance premiums or other (income-re- 
lated) contributions. No country is reducing the 
number of persons covered by mandatory health 
insurance. 
Public contract model 
There are some signs of convergence on the 
so-called public contract model,* i.e. a public financing 
of health care combined with a system of contracts 
between providers and third-party purchasers of care 
(e.g. Regional Health Authorities or insurers). In 
countries with a "classical" National Health Service 
(e.g. Finland, New Zealand, Russia, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and some Southern and Eastern 
European countries) this trend reflects a move away 
from a vertically integrated system towards a 
separation of the purchaser and the providers of care, 
who then have to conclude contracts with each other. 
In a "classical" National Health Service the Regional 
Health Authorities (or County Councils) are respon- 
sible for both purchasing and providing care. The 
combination of being both a monopsonistic buyer 
and a monopolistic seller of care involves the danger 
of provider domination ("provider capture"). As a 
result, these health care systems may have become 
more provider-oriented than consumer-oriented, 
and consequently (the incentives for) efficiency and 
responsiveness are weakened. Therefore, a strong 
case can be made for the creation of organizations 
whose only responsibility is to be a clear defender of 
the consumers' interests and who have incentives to 
do so. Creation of this kind of "consumer interest 
organization" can be achieved by a separation of the 
purchasing function and the provider function. In 
countries where insurers or sickness funds tradition- 
ally reimbursed patients in cash for the cost of their 
medical care (Belgium, France, and partly the 
Netherlands) we see a trend towards direct payment 
of the providers by the insurer or sickness fund, based 
on contracts between them. This gives the "remote" 
third-party payer the opportunity to become a 
prudent buyer of care on behalf of its members. 
Consumer choice of provider 
A third trend that can be observed is an increase 
in the consumers' freedom to choose a provider. This 
trend can be observed, for example, in Denmark, 
Finland, the United Kingdom and Sweden. A 
consumer choice of provider may lead to consumer- 
led competition among the providers of care. 
Competition among providers 
A trend towards competition among providers of 
care can be observed in many countries: Germany, 
Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, Russia and other Eastern Euro- 
pean countries. The trend is not towards a free 
market, but towards regulated competition. The 
emphasis of government regulation is switching away 
from command-and-control measures towards pro- 
competition policies. Third-party purchasers nego- 
tiate with the providers about he quality, volume and 
price of care. The results of the negotiations are 
reflected in the contracts between the purchasers and 
providers of care. Selective contracting by third-party 
purchasers i expected to yield competition among 
providers. 
Competition among third-party purchasers 
A more controversial issue in market-oriented 
health care reforms is the question whether or not 
there should also be competition among the 
third-party purchasers of care. In Belgium, Germany, 
Israel, the Netherlands, Russia and Switzerland the 
choice has been made in favour of a competitive 
market for third-party purchasing. The United 
Kingdom and Sweden chose for a regional monopoly 
of the third-party purchaser. In New Zealand, 
Portugal and Italy the option to opt-out the public 
system and to choose an alternative "third-party 
purchaser" instead of the Regional Health Authority 
has been seriously discussed but was ultimately 
rejected. 
Strengthening primary care 
In many countries a strengthening of the position 
of primary care providers can be observed: Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden ("Family Doctor Reform", 1994), the United 
Kingdom and the U.S. (managed care plans). 
General practitioners (GPs) are assumed to function 
as a gatekeeper to second-line care such as specialist 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  care, prescription drugs and hospital care. A further 
*For the introduction of this terminology, see [1]. step is to give the primary care providers financial 
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responsibility for (a part of) the costs of the follow-up 
care provided by others to their patients. Since 1991 
GPs in the United Kingdom can voluntarily become 
a GP-fundholder. In 1996 about 40% of the 
population in the United Kingdom has a fundholding 
GP, i.e. a GP who bears the financial responsibility 
for purchasing part of the second-line care. Surpluses 
may be invested in the GPs' practices. Since 1994 the 
regional associations of ambulatory physicians in 
Germany receive a budget for their own services plus 
prescription drugs. Deficits in the drug budget have 
to be compensated by a reduction of the fee for the 
physician services. In Finland about 200 primary 
health care centres purchase all second-line care 
needed for a given population. Experiments with 
fundholding primary care centres have been held in 
Russia (Leningrad and Kuzbass), Sweden (Bohus and 
Dalarna), Israel (Negev) and Switzerland. The 
European forms of "budgetholding primary care 
centres" bear a resemblance to the "shared risk 
pools" as applied in health maintenance organiz- 
ations (HMOs) in the U.S. [7]. 
Choices in health care 
Finally, more and more countries are realizing that 
society can no longer afford to make all new medical 
technologies available to everyone. Therefore, there is 
an increasing need in developed countries to make 
choices about what health services should be 
available to everybody independent of one's purchas- 
ing power. Each country probably has its own 
publicly debated, painful cases of denying an 
expensive high-tech medical treatment to an identifi- 
able patient, like the case of Coby Howard (Oregon, 
1987) and Child B. (the United Kingdom, 1995). 
Making these choices in health care (sometimes 
indicated as "rationing") can be done either by 
excluding certain medical treatments from the 
mandatory health insurance coverage and/or by the 
use of protocols and guidelines. The first strategy 
has been explicitly applied in Oregon [8]. In other 
countries where choices in health care are explicitly 
debated, like the Netherlands [9], New Zealand [10], 
Sweden [11] and the United Kingdom [12], there 
exists a preference for the second strategy. Given 
the expected developments in medical technology, 
"choices in health care" may become the major issue 
in health care reform in the next decade. 
FUTURE OPTIONS 
The above-mentioned trends indicate a global 
direction of the market-oriented health care reforms 
in many countries. Most of these reforms are in an 
initial stage. A full realization can take a decade or 
longer. An interesting question therefore is what 
future trends can be expected. In this section we will 
extrapolate the current rends and speculate on some 
future options. 
A prime role for primary care 
One of the current trends is a strengthening of 
primary care and the role of primary care physicians. 
In some countries (e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom) it has been quite usual for 
already a long period of time to have a personal GP 
as a family practitioner who is assumed to authorize 
and coordinate all needed care. In order to be eligible 
for specialist care, one generally has to be referred by 
one's GP. There are several advantages of having a 
GP as a personal physician who authorizes and 
coordinates care, such as: 
(1) There is a high chance--much igher than in 
the case of self-referral--that the patient is 
referred at the right time directly to the right 
specialist; 
(2) GPs as well-informed agents for their patients 
may evaluate the quality of care delivered by 
other providers and can be helpful in selecting 
good quality second-line providers; 
(3) GPs may coordinate the drugs prescribed by 
other physicians, which may reduce adverse 
drug effects; 
(4) It may lead to more personal care for the 
patient because of the longstanding personal 
relation between the GP, the patient and the 
patient's family; and 
(5) It may also lead to a close cooperation between 
the GP and specialists, which may ultimately 
result in both better quality and lower costs due 
to: better cooperation and mutual understand- 
ing between GPs and specialists; the specialist 
"retraining" the GP and the GP informing the 
specialist about the patient's personal circum- 
stances, medical history and other relevant 
background; common protocols and pro- 
cedures for medical treatment and referrals; 
better referrals, i.e. with a specific purpose in 
mind and carefully selected questions from the 
GP to the specialist; less unnecessary treat- 
ments and diagnostic tests by specialists in 
hospitals; and shorter specialist treatments 
because the specialist is aware of the GP's 
capabilities. 
An often mentioned isadvantage of the GP-gate- 
keeper model is the restricted entry to specialist care. 
Nevertheless, because having a GP as a personal 
physician who authorizes and coordinates care can 
help to improve the efficiency in health care--which 
is one of the goals of market-oriented health care 
reforms--the trend towards a strengthening of 
primary care can be expected to continue. 
Contracts 
A second trend that can be expected to continue for 
the next decade in many countries is the trend 
towards contracts between third-party purchasers 
and the providers of care. Compared with the 
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reimbursement model, where an individual consumer 
acts as the purchaser at the time that he needs care, 
the contract model, where a third-party purchaser 
(e.g. a Regional Health Authority, a County Council, 
a sickness fund or an insurer) acts as a prudent buyer 
of care on behalf of its members, has the following 
advantages: 
• the third-party purchaser can reduce the 
information asymmetry between purchaser and 
provider by employing or hiring medical 
advisors; 
• the third-party purchaser can exert his market 
power while negotiating with the providers of 
care; 
• the third-party purchaser can collect and 
compare performance indicators of the providers 
and thereby stimulate quality assessment; 
• the third-party purchaser, who contracts with 
providers of different ypes of care, can stimulate 
via the contracts the coordination of these types 
of care; and 
• the third-party purchaser can develop a long- 
term contractual relationship with providers and 
thereby stimulate the planning of health care 
facilities. 
Compared with a "classical" National Health 
Service, the contract model has the advantage that it 
can improve the flexibility of the health care system 
and make the system less provider-dominated and 
more consumer-oriented. 
Despite the relatively high transaction costs of the 
contract model, at least for the next decade, the trend 
towards contracts between third-party purchasers 
and providers of care can be expected to continue. 
Contracts between purchasers and primary care 
physicians. A logical way for third-party purchasers 
(Regional Health Authorities, County Councils, 
sickness funds or insurers) to build up a network of 
contractual rrangements is to follow the natural way 
the patient enters the health care system. Therefore, 
third-party purchasers could start to concentrate on 
the contracts with the primary care physicians. 
Contracts with other providers (specialist care and 
institutional care) could then be a natural comp- 
lement to these contracts and in fact could be 
supportive to the conditions agreed upon in the 
contracts between the purchaser and the primary care 
physicians. Primary care physicians could select the 
specialists and the hospitals with which they prefer to 
cooperate and to which they prefer to refer their 
patients. In this way the knowledge and experience of 
the GPs and their professional views about how to 
provide good quality care and how to organize health 
care efficiently can be combined with the power of the 
purchaser to contract selectively with specialists and 
hospitals. Especially when the GPs prefer a certain 
practice style (e.g. certain guidelines or protocols) in 
their cooperation with other providers, the contracts 
between the purchaser and these other providers can 
be a powerful tool to achieve the desired practice 
style. 
In applying the strategy of giving a prime role to 
primary care, the purchasers may run up against a 
shortage of GPs. In that case, they could make it 
(financially) attractive for hospital-based specialists, 
e.g. an internist, a gynaecologist or a paediatrician, to 
come to work in a large primary care centre. This 
could yield all the above-mentioned a vantages of a 
close cooperation between GPs and specialists. They 
could function partly as the personal primary care 
physician who coordinates all the care for specific 
patients, like diabetics, women between 15 and 45 
years of age, and young children; and they could 
partly function as a consultant to the other primary 
care physicians within the centre. In large primary 
care centres these "primary care specialists" could 
work on a full-time basis, while in the case of smaller 
centres they could combine part-time working in the 
primary care centre with part-time working in the 
hospital. 
As prudent buyers of care on behalf of their 
members, the purchasers can be expected to conclude 
contracts with primary care physicians that contain 
elements for improving efficiency, responsiveness and 
coordination of care. Responsiveness, in terms of 
convenient locations, opening hours, waiting lists, 
waiting times in the physician's office and attainabil- 
ity by telephone, is probably quite straightforward. 
With respect o efficiency and coordination of care, 
things are more complicated. There appears to be a 
large variation in practice styles among physicians 
[13]. Mokkink [14] found that different practice styles 
of Dutch GPs have considerable consequences in
terms of quality of care and costs. He distinguished 
four styles of practice. 
The "integrated work style" involves a GP who 
looks at the total picture of a patient--cultural, social 
and psychological--and develops a strong rapport 
with the patient. These physicians refer to specialists 
less frequently, prescribe fewer drugs, have fewer 
unnecessary diagnostic treatments, and are less 
aggressive in their use of medical technologies. The 
reduction in their referral pattern is solely due to a 
substantial reduction of referrals for non-severe, 
self-limiting diseases. Due to their style, these 
physicians have lower iatrogenic disease rates and 
lower costs (approximately 25-35%) than physicians 
with other work styles. 
Having identified GPs with such a desired practice 
style, it would be very attractive for purchasers to 
selectively contract only with these GPs. However, 
these GPs probably will form a minority (about 
one-quarter in Mokkink's study), so by following this 
strategy the purchasers would not contract enough 
primary care for their members. Therefore, it is also 
necessary to contract GPs with less desirable working 
styles and change their styles into the desired 
direction. For example, a purchaser can reward GPs 
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for going to continuing education courses, refresher 
courses, etc. A purchaser could invest in setting up a 
medical monitoring system that provides physicians 
with relevant information about their working style 
and their performance. In addition, the purchaser 
could contract with a GP who is well respected 
within the GP community to provide feedback and 
clinical direction to other GPs [15]. It appears that 
physicians' practice style can be changed by 
providing the physicians with relevant information 
about their behaviour [16, 17]. In concert, the 
purchasers and the GPs should come to a 
remuneration system that rewards good quality and 
desired practice style [18]. They should determine 
good outcome measures [19], as well as measurable 
parameters of good quality care and desired working 
style. Subsequently, the primary care physicians' 
remuneration should be such that the physicians' 
income is higher the closer the ideal parameter values 
are approached. Although most physicians have 
idealistic motives for delivering the best quality care, 
it would be naive to assume that these motives are the 
only determinant of their practice style. 
Several examples can be given of how the method 
of remuneration influences GPs' behaviour. After 
replacing the GPs' full capitation scheme by a mixed 
capitation and fee-for-service system in Copenhagen 
(1985), the rates of examinations and treatments 
that attracted specific additional remuneration rose 
significantly compared with a control group for 
which the remuneration system remained unchanged: 
diagnostic services rose by 48% and curative services 
by 69%. The referral rates to secondary specialist 
care fell by 21% and the hospital referral rates fell by 
34%, both as compared to the control group [20]. 
Another study focused on the effects of adding a 
productivity bonus (related to the gross monthly 
charges generated by the physicians) to the flat rate 
fee per hour of primary care physicians (Boston, 
1985). As a result of the new financial incentives, the 
physicians increased the number of laboratory tests 
performed per patient visit by 23% and the number 
of X-ray films per visit by 16%. The total charges per 
month, adjusted for inflation, grew by 20%, mostly 
as a result of a 12% increase in the average number 
of patient visits per month [21]. In a third study it 
was found that the use of capitation or salaries as a 
way of reimbursing primary care physicians was 
associated with 7% and 13%, respectively, lower 
rates of hospitalization than the use of fee-for- 
service payment [22]. A fourth study found that 
bonus payments, dependent on prescription rates, 
referral rates and hospitalization rates, on top of 
the GPs' capitation, resulted in approximately 10% 
lower utilization of services (Tilburg, 1984-1988) 
[231. 
The lesson to be learned form these studies is that 
financial incentives matter (although not all import- 
ant incentives are financial) and that it is important 
to structure the method of primary care physicians' 
remuneration i  such a way that desired practice 
styles are rewarded. This con be done by some bonus 
elements, with the bonus(es) related, for example, to 
prescription drugs, referral rates, inpatient care and 
overall per capita costs, with all figures adjusted for 
age, gender and health status. Note that there is an 
essential difference between such a remuneration 
scheme and the GP fundholding scheme in the United 
Kingdom. The GP-fundholders eceive a budget from 
which they have to purchase other care, like hospital 
care, specialist care or prescription drugs. In the case 
of performance-related bonuses, it is the third-party 
purchaser who contracts the GPs and who also 
purchases the second-line care. Appropriate financial 
incentives (bonuses) for the primary care physicians, 
who are responsible for the coordination and 
pre-authorization f secondary care, then stimulate 
desired practice styles and desired outcomes. 
Contracts between purchasers and second-line 
providers. All kinds of contractual arrangements 
between the purchaser and the second-line providers 
may emerge. The contracts may deal with matters 
like quality of care, volume, responsiveness, waiting 
lists, available capacity, costs and cooperation with 
primary care physicians. The purchaser may contract 
with different (groups of) providers: with individual 
specialists, (networks of) groups of specialists or 
medical staff; with individual hospitals or networks of 
hospitals; or with "provider organizations", consist- 
ing of combinations of the above-mentioned ntities, 
which may be mutually linked to each other via 
contractual arrangements. 
As far as the financial aspects of the contracts are 
concerned, one can think of all kinds of methods of 
reimbursement. Hospital payment could consist of a 
prospectively determined budget, case-payments or
per diem payments. Individual physicians could be 
salaried, paid a fixed amount per period per person 
(capitation), or they could be paid a fee for each item 
of service. Groups of physicians could be paid a 
predetermined capitated amount, while the group 
pays the individual physicians in a self-determined 
way. All kinds of financial risk sharing between the 
purchaser, hospitals and (groups of) physicians can 
be thought of. 
Via the contracts the purchasers can stimulate 
many kinds of utilization management techniques to 
control unnecessary or unnecessarily expensive use of 
care. These strategies can incorporate a variety of 
tactics. The setting of care can be relocated from a 
high-cost location (a hospital) to a low-cost location 
(a home or nursing facility) through discharge 
planning. Prior authorization for inpatient care and 
second surgical opinions may improve efficiency. 
Outpatient care can be substituted for inpatient care, 
and a greater emphasis can be placed on primary 
care. Improved utilization of existing facilities (by 
evening or weekend operation, or by closing 
excess capacity) can result in higher efficiency. 
660 Wynand P. M. M. van de Ven 
Rationalization of labour practices, involving work 
force reallocations, can also reduce costs. 
In order to be able to conclude contracts and 
implement a variety of utilization management 
programmes, the presence of well-developed manage- 
ment information systems is a prerequisite [24]. The 
initiative for developing these information systems 
could be taken by large provider-organizations, by a
network or group of providers, or by the purchaser. 
For example, when a purchaser contracts with 
individual primary care physicians or relatively small 
primary care centres, these providers cannot afford to 
buy a sophisticated management information system. 
In that case the purchaser could do it and could be 
supportive of the primary care physicians not only in 
making physicians' profiles and utilization manage- 
ment, but also in selecting efficient hospitals. 
Contracts between purchasers and consumers of 
care, In countries with a "classical" Natural Health 
Service, the way that budgets were allocated to 
hospitals did not contain incentives to attract more 
patients because "the money did not follow the 
patients". An important aspect of the reform in, for 
example, New Zealand, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, therefore, is that "the money follows the 
patient". This principle is assumed to be an important 
incentive for the providers of care to accept contracts 
that contain incentives for efficiency, responsiveness 
and coordination of care. As far as responsiveness i  
concerned, this reasoning makes sense: because 
consumers like responsiveness, they will choose 
providers of care who are responsive. But with 
respect o the incentives for efficiency and coordi- 
nation of care, it need not work that way. Physicians 
often put forward that their patients urge them to 
prescribe useless drugs (e.g. the chronic use of 
sleeping pills or antibiotics for a simple cold caused 
by a virus) or unnecessarily refer them to a specialist. 
According to physicians, the patients often urge them 
to perform all kinds of cost-ineffective diagnostic 
procedures. If individual consumers do not have any 
personal interest in receiving efficient and coordi- 
nated care, while the money .follows the patient, the 
efficient providers might have a rough time in 
attracting enough patients! Indeed, if patients, for 
whatever easons, prefer inefficient and uncoordi- 
nated care to efficient and coordinated care--keeping 
responsiveness equal--both the patients and the 
money will go to providers of inefficient and 
uncoordinated care. 
Therefore, it makes sense to give the consumer, 
analogously to the natural incentive to go to 
responsive providers, a monetary incentive to go to 
efficient providers and agree with their practice style 
(e.g. guidelines and protocols). So a natural 
coping-stone of the contractual arrangements be- 
tween the purchaser and the providers is a contract 
between the purchaser and the consumers of care. In 
return for a monetary reward these contracts might 
specify some conditions for receiving care. These 
conditions could relate to who delivers the care (e.g. 
only those who are indicated on a list of "preferred" 
providers), where the care is delivered (e.g. in 
hospitals with which the chosen primary care 
physician cooperates) and the acceptance of the 
coordination and authorization by some physician or 
provider organization (e.g. referral; secondary surgi- 
cal opinion; pre-authorization f hospitalization). Of
course, there have to be exclusions for emergency 
cases, for out-of-area cases, and probably also for 
some forms of very highly specialized care. In this 
way different kinds of coordinated-care contracts 
between the third-party purchaser and the consumers 
of care may arise. Preferably, these contracts hould 
be attuned to the contracts between the purchaser 
and the providers of care. In order to be sure that the 
purchasers fulfil their duty to contract enough care 
according to the needs of their members and to 
guarantee that the consumer has enough access to 
good care according to his needs, one might think of 
establishing a National Board on Certification, which 
has to certify all coordinated-care contracts. 
As far as the monetary rewards are concerned, one 
can think of reduced or no copayments, or a premium 
or tax reduction. The rationale behind these 
monetary incentives i that coordinated, efficient care 
and a totally free choice of provider cannot go 
together. However, it is possible to give the consumer 
a free choice between coordinated, efficient care for 
a reasonable price and uncoordinated, inefficient 
care for a high price. Ultimately, the choice is the 
consumer's. 
Convergence 
A third trend that can be expected to continue in 
many countries is the shift of government regulation 
from command-and-control measures towards pro- 
competition policies. An example of such a policy is 
to allow the third-party purchasers to selectively 
contract with providers of care. This will yield 
competition among providers. The trend towards 
competition among providers of care can be expected 
to continue. However, a more controversial issue is 
whether or not there will also be competition among 
the third-party purchasers of care. Several arguments 
can be mentioned in the discussion about the choice 
between a competitive model and a monopsonistic 
model (i.e. a monopolistic market for third-party 
purchasing in combination with a competitive 
provider market). 
An argument in favour of the monopsonistic model 
is that a monopsonistic third-party purchaser can 
exert maximum buyer power to obtain the best 
medical care at the lowest prices, especially when the 
provider market is highly competitive. Another 
argument in favour of the monopsonistic model is 
that transaction costs are likely to be lower than in 
a competitive market, since providers have to 
conclude a contract with a single purchaser only, 
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Moreover, the costs of advertising will be lower. 
Finally, a single purchaser may be preferred because 
it may facilitate the coherence and coordination of 
local health care delivery, which is considered to be 
important from a public health perspective. The 
Achilles' heel of the monopsonistic model, however, 
is the lack of incentives for the third-party purchaser 
to act as an agent on behalf of the consumers. One 
may wonder why a monopsonistic third-party 
purchaser should not enjoy a quiet life. Hence, a 
system of regulatory incentives and monitoring 
should be developed to guarantee that the single 
third-party purchaser will act in the consumers' 
interest. An option might be to have management 
teams bidding for franchises which would period- 
ically be recontracted [25]. 
A strong argument in favour of the competitive 
model is that competition can provide the purchasers 
with incentives to act as an effective agent on behalf 
of their (potential) customers.* However, compe- 
tition does not automatically generate appropriate 
incentives. In case of competition among third-party 
purchasers the key problem is to maintain access and 
prevent cream skimming, i.e. selection of "profitable" 
consumers. Therefore, a competitive market of third 
party purchasing should be complemented with a 
mechanism to guarantee access and to remove 
incentives for cream skimming. Although there are 
technical possibilities to prevent cream skimming 
[27], a lot of experimentation a d evaluation is still 
needed to assess their feasibility in practice. In a 
monopsonistic compulsory health insurance market 
the problem of cream skimming is nonexistent. 
Hence, in both competitive and monopsonistic 
markets for third-party purchasing of health care 
additional regulation is needed to guarantee that 
third-party purchasers act in the consumers' interest. 
However, the nature of the required government 
intervention in both market types will be quite 
different. Consequently, in different countries the 
chosen way of (re)forming the market for third-party 
purchasing will depend on the possibility to find 
workable solutions to these problems [5]. The 
problems related to a competitive market for 
third-party purchasing may be more severe for 
countries that formerly had a National Health 
Service than for insurance-based systems because of 
a lack of data for the calculation of risk-adjusted 
capitation payments to the competing third-party 
purchasers and because of a lack of experience with 
the regulatory regime for a competitive market of 
third-party purchasing. 
An interesting question is whether in the long run, 
when these technical problems have been solved, 
there might occur a convergence, and if so, to what 
model. According to Enthoven [28], the ideal market 
*In this paper I restrict myself to the so-called non- 
catastrophic risks. For a discussion on catastrophic 
risks, see [26]. 
structure would give each medical care organization 
effective incentives to produce maximum value for 
money for enrolled subscribers. It should be based on 
integrated financing and delivery systems--partner- 
ships that link doctors, hospitals and insurers--with 
per capita prepayment, with providers at risk for 
costs of care and costs of poor quality, publicly 
accountable for quality and per capita costs. The 
ideal market structure must be managed by active, 
intelligent, collective purchasing agents, called spon- 
sors, that contract with health care systems and set 
the rules of competition. In Enthoven's ideal model 
there is competition among accountable health plans. 
These health plans fulfil the insurance function and 
must have under contract a panel of providers 
capable of delivering the full range of covered 
services. 
In practice we may see in different countries all 
types of mixed models, containing elements of both 
the competitive model and the monopsonistic model. 
A good example of a dynamic mixed model is the 
United Kingdom. When the reforms started in the 
early 1990s, the monopolistic Regional Health 
Authorities were the dominant third-party purchasers 
of care. The number of GP-fundholders, who partly 
fulfil the role of purchaser of second-line care, was 
relatively small, and the amount of hospital care that 
they purchased was only about 15% of the total costs 
of hospital care delivered to their patients. However, 
over time some interesting developments are taking 
place. First, the number of GP-fundholders steadily 
increases each year. Second, some GP-fundholders 
form purchaser coalitions in order to strengthen their 
position as purchaser and reduce the transaction 
costs related to contracting; for example, more than 
I00 fundholding GPs in Birmingham, who serve 
more than 200,000 patients, work together in 
Birmingham Multifund. Third, in 1996 a new type of 
GP-fundholder--besides the traditional GP-fund- 
holder--was introduced: the so-called full-fundhold- 
ership. The GP who opts to be a full-fundholder 
bears, in principle, the financial responsibility for all 
the follow-up costs of his/her patients. Combination 
of these new developments, together with the 
consumer's freedom to choose his GP, might yield a 
subsystem of the health care sector that consists of 
competing "multifunds". Via coordinated-care con- 
tracts, as discussed in the previous section, the 
difference between these multifunds and insurers 
(acting as third-party purchasers of care) or health 
plans in the competitive model may further diminish. 
Time will show whether the competitive model or the 
monopsonistic model will appear to be dominant in 
the United Kingdom. By the same token, Clause 6c 
in the New Zealand Health and Disability Services 
Bill 1992, which allows for the eventual existence of 
alternative (competing) health care plans as pur- 
chasers, may ultimately change the dominant model 
of the New Zealand health care system. The same 
holds true for Portugal and Italy, where "opting-out" 
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has seriously been discussed. In Israel the consumers 
have a free choice of sickness funds, which own 
hospitals and employ physicians. According to 
Chinitz [29], the Israeli health care has the potential 
to come close to realizing the conditions for managed 
competition outlined by Enthoven. Although it is too 
early to speculate on a convergence to some "ideal 
model", it is interesting to carefully analyse the 
similarities (and differences) in health care reform in 
different countries. 
Cost containment 
Cost containment is an important element in the 
discussion about health care reform. Therefore, an 
interesting question is: can a competitive health care 
system be successful in cost containment? Is there any 
evidence? Because the trend towards competition i  
health care is still in an initial stage, it is not yet 
possible to come up with any definite conclusion 
about the potential success of competition with 
respect to cost containment. Although managed care 
plans in the U.S. (HMOs and preferred provider 
insurance) are able to reduce costs and offer value for 
money [30-32], they have not helped to slow national 
health expenditures. According to Enthoven [33], this 
can be explained because the practices of purchasers 
(including overnment and employers), the tax laws, 
and other market imperfections reduced the demand 
for cost containment, and thereby deprived managed 
care plans of an adequate incentive to cut cost and 
price. According to Enthoven, competition has not 
yet been tried. 
Nevertheless, there are results from some U.S, 
studies that offer encouragement for advocates of the 
regulated competition approach. Wholey et al. [34] 
examined the effects of market structure on HMO 
premiums from 1988 to 1991. They found that more 
competition, measured by the number of HMOs in 
the market area, reduces HMO premiums, In an 
other study Feldstein and Wickizer [35] also found 
results that support the belief that HMO-induced 
competition has the potential to control the rate of 
increase in health care costs. They found that a 10% 
increase in the HMO market penetration rate would, 
on average, lead to a 6.5% lower annual rate of 
increase in health insurance premiums. Zwanziger 
et al. [36] found that the introduction of selective 
contracting in California in 1982 has reduced the 
growth rate of hospital costs. Selective contracting 
had induced hospitals in highly competitive markets 
to decrease their costs, over the period 1982-1990, by 
almost 13% relative to costs at the less competitive 
hospitals. Some further preliminary results about 
*E.g. open entry to the market, well-informed consumers, 
an adequate anti-cartel policy, transparency of the 
market and protection of the population against 
quackery. 
tFor arguments ofwhether or not the government should 
put a global budget on total health care expenditures, see 
[37]. 
the effects of competition i  health care come from 
the Netherlands and Sweden. The introduction of 
selective contracting in the Netherlands in the early 
1990s resulted in a reduction of the prices for medical 
devices by a quarter to a third. The introduction 
of competitive lements in Sweden ("Stockholm 
model") resulted in a substantial increase in 
physicians' productivity. 
Although it is too early for definite conclusions 
about the effect of competition on costs, it is 
interesting to think about the expected effects of 
competition. It appears that politicians have expec- 
tations about the outcome of a competitive health 
care market hat do not correspond with economic 
theory. Politicians trongly focus on cost contain- 
ment in the sense of stabilizing the fraction of gross 
national product to be spent on health care. 
Politicians often consider egulated competition in 
health care as a substitute for detailed government 
regulation with respect to prices, volume and capacity 
in order to contain cost. However, economic theory 
predicts that under certain (ideal) conditions,* 
competition may improve the efficiency, quality, 
innovation and responsiveness to consumers' prefer- 
ences--none of which is synonymous with cost 
containment in the political sense. Regulated 
competition can be expected to yield "more value 
for money". However, tf additional health care 
can contribute to one's health, and /f competition 
in health care yields more value for money, and 
tf most people judge a good health status to be the 
most important thing in life (more important than 
a good marriage, housing or job)--as does 60% of 
the Dutch population--then we cannot exclude 
the option that a competitive health care system 
yields both more efficiency (lower unit costs) and 
higher total costs (units of higher quality and/or more 
units). 
As a consequence of rising health care expenditures 
the cross-subsidies that are necessary to guarantee 
access to care for the sick and low-income arners 
may also go up. This might ultimately have an 
adverse ffect on the economic process and thereby 
induce government toput a global budget (or cap) on 
the public expenditures on health care, i.e. the 
expenditures which are necessary for the cross-subsi- 
dies to the sick and low-income arners.t 
Choices in health care 
Given the above-indicated trend towards a 
market-oriented health care and a cap on the public 
health care expenditures which are necessary for the 
cross-subsidies to the sick and low-income arners, a
crucial question becomes: to what types of health care 
should the compulsory health insurance provide 
access? Should everybody have guaranteed access via 
the compulsory health insurance to all care with 
any positive benefits, independent of the costs? Can 
equity be maintained in a competitive health care 
system? 
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In 1991 the Dutch Government Committee on 
Choices in Health Care advised the government that 
only care that has been proven to be effective should 
be included in the benefits package of the mandatory 
health insurance [38]. All care that has not been 
proven to be effective, as well as all care that has been 
proven to be not effective, should not be included in 
the mandatory insurance benefits package. Further, 
the Committee advised to exclude those benefits 
from the compulsory health insurance for which the 
costs are high and the expected benefits are very low, 
These excluded types of care are referred to as 
"cost-ineffective" care. The Committee stressed that 
it is important o consider the effectiveness of a 
certain treatment in relation the medical indication 
and the condition of the patient. 
In several ectures about the Committee's report 
presented by this author to physicians, the question 
was asked: what percentage of the care that is 
currently being paid for by the social health insurance 
system do you think has been proven to be effective? 
Most estimates of the Dutch physicians ranged 
between 20 and 40% and never above 50%. 
Frequently mentioned examples of ineffective care 
are: routine laboratory tests, lasting physiotherapy, 
antibiotics in case of a simple cold caused by a virus, 
chronic use of sleeping pills, routine physical 
examinations and lasting psychotherapy. The appli- 
cation of the criterion "effectiveness" would probably 
substantially reduce the entitlements on benefits 
covered by the mandatory health insurance. Never- 
theless, it is nearly impossible to leave specific services 
out of the basic benefits package on the basis of the 
(cost-) effectiveness criterion. The reason is that the 
effectiveness of care has to be considered in relation 
to the medical indication and the condition of the 
patient. Therefore, the Committee places the 
responsibility for cost-effective care primarily on the 
professions and their organizations. They must work 
with others in society in developing the standards for 
cost-effective care. The medical profession should be 
active in setting up decision procedures in situations 
in which the chance of the medical success is low. 
Areas that could receive attention are, for example, 
neonatology, chemotherapy for cancer and trans- 
plants. Likewise, the professions hould set up 
standards and guidelines for everyday care and use 
them to assure quality of care. Because vulnerable 
patients in need of care have a very high willingness 
to pay to grasp at a straw, the government should 
protect he population against the marketing of futile 
care--"your money or your life"--by the medical 
industry which has an interest, just like any other 
industry, in enlarging their business. In order to 
reduce the consumer's demand for futile, low-yield 
care the population should be well-informed about 
the low effectiveness of certain medical procedures for 
specific conditions. The Committee suggested the 
provision of information i  the form of comprehensi- 
ble information sheets, free telephone lines and the 
development of choice programmes on common 
dilemmas, such as whether or not to undergo a 
prostate operation. The public should be highly 
involved in defining the basic benefits package. 
Physicians hould explain their patients why a test or 
intervention i  their specific situation is unnecessary. 
This will increase the patient's understanding and his 
willingness to give up the idea that "more is better". 
All these activities hould be supported by financial 
incentives. The Committee is in favour of the 
introduction of specific economic incentives for the 
providers uch that the use of technology is not more 
highly rewarded than a consultation with the patient, 
taking the history, and physical examination. 
Bonuses and selective contracting could provide 
complementary incentives to work cost-effectively. 
Although financial incentives hould primarily be 
addressed to the physicians, they could also be 
addressed, as discussed previously, to the patients. 
Consumer choice of insurance contract. According 
to the Dutch reform proposal (1988), the insured may 
choose among several insurance contracts offered by 
the insurers. All insurance contracts hould cover (at 
least) a standardized basic benefits package. One 
insurer may offer several insurance contracts as long 
as the insured's rights are in accordance with the law. 
Besides a so-called "Total Freedom" policy, which 
reimburses all accounts from all health care providers 
without any restriction, insurers could also offer 
so-called "limited provider plans", like HMOs or 
preferred provider insurance arrangements. Most of 
the costs would then only be reimbursed when the 
service is given or prescribed by contracted and 
carefully selected providers. By specifying quality, 
volume, price and efficiency of care in the contracts 
with the providers, insurers could offer cost-effective 
care. The Government Committee on Choices in 
Health care advised that insurers hould be allowed 
to refuse to reimburse costs for cost-ineffective care. 
The Committee called such an insurance contract the 
"Appropriate Care" policy. (There is a clear analogy 
between such an Appropriate Care policy and the 
coordinated-care contracts discussed earlier.) The 
insured would be free to buy, for example, a Total 
Freedom policy that unconditionally reimburses all 
health expenditures, but of course the premium of the 
latter policy would be much higher than that of the 
former policy. The cross-subsidies to the sick and 
low-income arners hould only be dependent on the 
health status of the insured, and not on the chosen 
policy. If there are groups are consumers who prefer 
to receive care from a certain etwork of health care 
providers, the insurers can be expected to respond to 
these preferences by offering special policies coupled 
to this network of providers. Thus could the 
consumers choose one or another insurance contract 
on the basis of their preferences, their ideas about 
health care, their lifestyle or beliefs. The insurance 
contract would be linked on the one hand to the 
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conditions on the care to be received (for example: 
which providers? which facilities? which guidelines?) 
and on the other hand to the insurance premium. In 
this way the consumer can make important "choices 
in health care" through his/her choice of insurance 
contract. 
A difference between the Appropriate Care policy 
and the Total Freedom policy could be as follows. 
Suppose there is a certain disease or impairment that 
can be diagnosed and cured by different methods with 
different degrees of certainty and different prices: 
method 1 with 99% certainty, which costs $100, and 
method 2 with 99.9% certainty, which costs $10,000. 
The Appropriate Care policy with a relatively low 
premium would probably cover method ! and not 
method 2, while the Total Freedom policy with a very 
high premium might cover method 2. Another 
example: suppose in a certain life-threatening 
situation there exists a treatment with a 1% chance 
of success and a price of $500,000. The Appropriate 
Care policy would not cover this treatment because 
of its low cost-effectiveness, while the Total Freedom 
policy might cover the treatment (provided that the 
treatment is not harmful to the patient). The idea of 
giving the consumer such a choice of insurance 
contract resembles Pauly's [39] proposal for compe- 
tition among health plans on the basis of the rate at 
which new technology is introduced. By offering a 
choice of insurance contracts, the consumer can 
make--within a certain range of l imits--a choice 
based on his own preferences with respect o health 
care, style of care and price. In order to protect he 
public against a situation where, after developing a 
serious illness, they regret their choice of insurance 
contract, each insurance contract should contain at 
least a specified list of benefits ("merit good" motive). 
Equity. Suppose that society makes the explicit 
choice that method 2 and the $500,000 treatment will 
not be included in the basic benefits package of the 
mandatory health insurance. The question then arises 
of whether such a health care system, in which those 
who can pay will receive method 2 and the $500,000 
treatment, and those who cannot pay will not receive 
these treatment, is acceptable for countries where 
solidarity and equity are high on the political 
agenda.* In answering this question one has to realize 
that given a limited amount of money available for 
the cross-subsidies form the healthy and high-income 
to the sick and low-income arners, such choices are 
not only necessary, but also just. Not making such 
explicit choices will yield an undesired arbitrary 
two-tier system. It will result in waiting lists and poor 
quality care in the publicly financed health care sector 
and prompt services and high-quality 61ite care in the 
privately financed sector. Those who can pay will 
*If the choice of insurance contract is not related to an 
individual's purchasing power, the choice of insurance 
contract reflects aconsumer's taste and preferences and 
need not be a problem. 
always find their way, abroad or in their own country. 
For example, in Ireland and in the United Kingdom 
salaried physicians working in a public hospital are 
allowed to treat private patients in their private 
practice for a private fee. Consequently, those who 
can afford can receive the treatment today, and those 
who cannot afford have to wait one or two years. The 
more successful cost containment is, the longer the 
waiting lists and the more the two-tiered system 
grows. In several Eastern European countries, 
formally speaking, health care is "free for all". 
However, in many cases patients have to make 
"under the table payments" to the provider. So the 
total income of salaried physicians often is a multiple 
of their formal salary. If society considers it unjust 
that there exists a different access to basic health 
services for those who have and those who have not, 
"making explicit choices today" is necessary to 
"share and share alike tomorrow". 
Given a limited amount of money available for the 
cross-subsidies to the sick and low-income arners, 
the interpretation of "equity" as "equal access to 
cost-effective care within a reasonable period of time" 
seems to be defensible. Nevertheless, this way of 
thinking is new to a great majority of the population 
in many developed countries and may be difficult to 
accept. Until recently, everything that was medically/ 
technically possible in health care had to be done. 
However, it should be realized that in other sectors 
in which health, life and death are at stake, 
health-promoting factors that are technically possible 
appear to be economically impossible, because--after 
weighing costs and benefits--people are not prepared 
to pay for them. This is seen, for example, in traffic 
safety (cars, airplanes, level crossings), nuclear power 
centres, occupational safety and the height of the 
dikes (a well-known problem in the Netherlands!). 
The fact that not providing some expensive care to a 
certain patient may result in an identifiable death, 
while the future victims of a preventable traffic 
accident or flood are unknown statistical deaths [40], 
should not be relevant for decision-making poli- 
ticians. If the marginal value of the last dollar spent 
on health care is lower than the marginal value of the 
last dollar spent on other goods than health care, 
the application of the cost-effectiveness criterion in 
health care might improve overall efficiency in 
society. Those who think it is unfair that low-income 
earners cannot afford method 2 and the $500,000 
treatment should realize that other health-influencing 
matters with probably a larger health effect, like safe 
cars and good housing (no environmental pollution, 
no damp, and no noise nuisance), can freely be 
bought by those who can afford and are willing to 
pay. 
Besides the "inequality" effect of allowing the 
happy few--if they wish--to buy method 2 and the 
$500,000 treatment, there is also a positive effect. 
(This argument does not hold if it is the poor few who 
can not afford). Over time the quality/price ratio of 
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these new technologies will probably improve, just as 
with computers and fax machines, so that after a 
certain period of time society may decide to include 
these technologies in the basic benefits package. If 
Mercedes and Volvo wouldn't have been allowed 
to firstly implement new safety technologies like 
ABS and airbags in their luxurious limousines, 
these technologies wouldn't now be available in a 
Volkswagen for a reasonable price. By not having 
blocked dynamic innovation a Volkswagen now is 
much safer than a Mercedes or Volvo was 30 years 
ago. Another positive effect is that new medical 
technologies first have to successfully stand the test of 
the market. The market will give signals to the 
industry whether or not new technologies, which are 
technically feasible, are also economically feasible. If 
even the highest-income groups do not consider a 
new technology to be "worthwhile", there is no need 
to include it in the mandatory basic benefits 
package. 
It is impossible on the basis of the cost-effectiveness 
criterion to define a mandatory basic benefits package 
for all societies for all time. Each society has to make 
its own choices whether or not organ transplants 
(kidney, heart, lung, and combinations), bone 
marrow transplants, coronary bypass operations, 
total parenteral nutrition, magnetic resonance imag- 
ing, laser operations of the eye (as a substitute for 
glasses) and expensive pharmaceuticals (e.g. the beta 
interferon drug Betaseron, which costs about $20,000 
per patient per year) are cost-worthy care, and 
whether the basic package should cover a $1000 or 
$5000 heart pacemaker. What can society afford? 
How large are the altruistic preferences within 
society? What are the opportunity costs of spending 
an extra dollar on health care? Each society has to 
make its own choices and should continuously update 
them. 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
In this paper we have indicated some international 
trends in health care reforms and explored some 
potential future options. From an international 
perspective we can observe a trend towards universal 
mandatory health insurance, contracts between 
third-party purchasers and the providers of care, 
competition among providers of care and a 
strengthening of primary care. These trends can be 
expected to continue. A more controversial issue is 
whether there should also be competition among the 
third-party purchasers and whether in the long run 
there will occur a convergence towards ome "ideal" 
model. The introduction of market-oriented lements 
(incentives, regulated competition) in health care has 
the advantage that it allows to break through the 
vicious circle of ever-increasing health care expendi- 
tures. In many health care systems there are more 
cost-increasing than cost-decreasing incentives. The 
medical industry has an interest in enlarging their 
business, physicians are often paid a fee for service 
(also for unnecessary care and for unnecessarily 
expensive care), third-party purchasers often have no 
interest in cost containment, and the consumer has 
zero or low marginal out-of-pocket payments because 
of health insurance. So there often exists a strong 
coalition in the health care sector with no interest in 
cost containment. Via market elements all parties can 
be given any interest, at different levels, in making a 
trade-off between costs and quality. 
However, although regulated competition i health 
care can be expected to yield more value for money, 
it cannot guarantee that health care expenditures will 
not further ise, or even go down. We cannot exclude 
the option that a competitive health care system 
yields both more efficiency and higher total costs. An 
important question, therefore, is: can equity be 
maintained in a competitive health care system? It has 
been argued that this can be done if we interpret 
equity as "equal access to cost-effective care within a 
reasonable period of time". 
Because the effectiveness of care has to be 
considered in relation to the medical indication and 
the condition of the patient, the responsibility for 
cost-effective care rests primarily with the providers 
of care. Guidelines and protocols should be 
developed by the profession and sustained by 
financial incentives embedded in contracts. 
It has been argued that the third-party purchasers 
could start to concentrate on the contracts with the 
primary care physicians. Contracts with other 
providers (specialist care and institutional care) could 
then be a natural complement to these contracts and 
could in fact be supportive to the conditions agreed 
upon in the contracts between the purchaser and the 
primary care physicians. Coordinated-care contracts 
between the third-party purchasers and the consumer 
of care could provide the consumer with monetary 
incentives to go to efficient providers. 
A consumer choice of insurance contract could 
give the consumer an opportunity to make important 
choices in health care through his/her choice of 
insurance contract. However, each society has to 
make its own choices about what care should be 
available to everybody independent ofan individual's 
purchasing power. 
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